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Parental Preferences for the Organization
of Preschool Vaccination Programs
Including Financial Incentives:
A Discrete Choice Experiment
Darren Flynn, PhD, Laura Ternent, PhD, Frauke Becker, PhD, Yemi Oluboyede, PhD,
Jean Adams, PhD
Objective: To establish preferences of parents and guar-
dians of preschool children for the organization of pre-
school vaccination services, including financial incentives.
Design: An online discrete choice experiment. Partici-
pants: Parents and guardians of preschool children (up to
age 5 years) who were (n = 259) and were not (n = 262)
classified as at high risk of incompletely vaccinating their
children. High risk of incomplete vaccination was defined
as any of the following: aged less than 20 years, single par-
ents, living in one of the 20% most deprived areas in Eng-
land, had a preschool child with a disability, or had more
than three children. Main Outcome Measures: Participant
preferences expressed as positive (utility) or negative
(disutility) on eight attributes and levels describing the
organization of preschool vaccination programs. Results:
There was no difference in preference for parental finan-
cial incentives compared to no incentive in parents ‘‘not
at high risk’’ of incomplete vaccination. Parents who were
‘‘at high risk’’ expressed utility for cash incentives. Parents
‘‘at high risk’’ of incomplete vaccination expressed utility
for information on the risks and benefits of vaccinations to
be provided as numbers rather than charts or pictures.
Both groups preferred universally available, rather than
targeted, incentives. Utility was identified for shorter wait-
ing times, and there were variable preferences for who
delivered vaccinations. Conclusions: Cash incentives for
preschool vaccinations in England would be welcomed by
parents who are ‘‘at high risk’’ of incompletely vaccinating
their children. Further work is required on the optimal
mode and form of presenting probabilistic information on
vaccination to parents/guardians, including preferences on
mandatory vaccination schemes. Key words: Preschool;
vaccination; financial incentives; discrete choice
experiment. (MDM Policy & Practice XXXX;XX:xx–xx)
Childhood vaccinations have been highly effec-tive in reducing the incidence of, and associ-
ated morbidity and mortality from, a range of infec-
tious diseases.1 To achieve herd immunity, the
World Health Organization recommends that cover-
age of most childhood vaccinations is at least 90%,
and 95% for diphtheria and measles.2,3
At the time of the research, the schedule of rec-
ommended vaccinations offered by the National
Health Service in England for low risk, prescho-ol
children (up to age 5 years) was 14 injections plus
two orally administered vaccines given over a mini-
mum of eight visits between 2 months and 5 years
of age. In England, preschool vaccinations are routi-
nely delivered by primary care doctors, or nurses, at
primary care centers. These vaccinations are recom-
mended but are not mandatory either before or on
entry into school. Coverage of preschool vaccina-
tions in England is generally high—nearing or
exceeding the World Health Organization recom-
mendations in most cases.4 However, these high
overall coverage rates hide wide geographical varia-
tions, with coverage of some vaccinations being
lower than 80% in some areas.4 These variations
persist into school years.
This has prompted interest in exploring new
ways of increasing preschool vaccination uptake.5
One method of doing this that has received atten-
tion is offering financial incentives to parents
who keep their children up-to-date with their
vaccinations.6
This Creative Commons Non Commercial CC-BY-NC: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attri-
bution-NonCommercial 4.0 License (http://www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/) which permits non-commercial use,
reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open
Access pages (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage).
 The Author(s) 2017
Reprints and permission:
http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/2381468317708319
ARTICLE
A recent systematic review identified only three
robust outcome evaluations of parental financial
incentives for preschool vaccinations.6 All of these
studies were conducted in the United States, with
mixed results. On the basis of absence of evidence,
the review drew no overall conclusion on the effec-
tiveness of these interventions. Financial incentive
interventions can also be controversial.7–9 This is
particularly the case in contexts such as the United
Kingdom where there is little experience with finan-
cial transactions for health care, and where such
interventions are likely to be funded through general
taxation. Given previous controversies surrounding
financial incentives for health behaviours,9 it is
highly unlikely that a parental financial incentive
program for preschool vaccinations would be imple-
mented in a setting such a England—even if it were
restricted to research—without first confirming that
this would be acceptable to parents, and other
stakeholders.10
The best overall measure of intervention accept-
ability is probable take-up of that intervention (i.e.,
revealed acceptability).11 However, where an inter-
vention has not yet been implemented, the views of
relevant stakeholders (i.e., stated acceptability) is
the best measure of acceptability available.
Few studies exploring acceptability of parental
incentive schemes for preschool vaccinations were
identified in a recent systematic review.6 Qualita-
tive research with parents and health visitors con-
ducted in London found they were not generally
supportive of linking welfare payments to vaccina-
tion status, due to concerns about undermining par-
ental choice.12 In Australia, where some universally
available child care welfare benefits are linked to chil-
dren’s vaccination status, parents report that obtain-
ing these benefits is not an appropriate reason for
vaccinating their children.13 These findings are sup-
ported by recent research from the United Kingdom
where parental financial incentives for preschool vac-
cinations were interpreted as ‘‘bribes,’’ by both par-
ents and health professionals, that could undermine
norms of responsible parenting.14 However, in the
United States, linking welfare benefit payments to
children’s vaccination status was reported as fair and
motivating to the majority of parents.15
When asked about the acceptability of parental
financial incentives for preschool vaccinations, and
other health behaviors, many respondents sponta-
neously propose a range of other methods to
achieve the desired outcomes.7,9,14 In the case of
preschool vaccinations, these include more flexible
appointments and more accessible information
about the pros and cons of vaccination.
Qualitative research can provide useful insights
into what aspects of parental financial incentive
schemes for preschool vaccinations are and are not
acceptable and why; and how vaccination services
could be made more acceptable in general. How-
ever, qualitative findings are not necessarily gener-
alizable, and relative preferences for different
aspects of the service cannot be determined. While
a survey could begin to address these issues, vacci-
nations services are complicated, consisting of a
range of different aspects, all of which can vary.
Furthermore, the frequency with which parents
spontaneously discussed other aspects of the pre-
school vaccination program that they felt could be
organized better led us to believe that it might be
hard to ask them to focus on acceptability of finan-
cial incentives in the absence of other potential
changes to the organization of preschool vaccina-
tion services. In order to more formally explore how
preferences for financial incentives for preschool
vaccinations varied alongside various other aspects
of organization of preschool vaccinations, we con-
ducted a discrete choice experiment (DCE).
Discrete choice experiments offer an additi-
onal approach to investigate acceptability of
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interventions. We conducted a DCE with the aim of
identifying relative preferences for parental finan-
cial incentives for preschool vaccinations, as well
as other aspects of preschool vaccination services in
England. We compared preferences of parents iden-
tified as ‘‘at high risk’’ of incompletely vaccinating
their children with those ‘‘not at high risk.’’ It is
particularly important to explore the preferences of
parents ‘‘at high risk,’’ as this subgroup would prob-
ably be the primary target of any parental incentive
scheme. We also considered it important to explore
the preferences of parents who were ‘‘not at high
risk’’ in order to determine the wider impact of
population-wide changes in the configuration of
vaccination services.
METHODS
Discrete choice experiments describe interven-
tions according to their key characteristics, or ‘‘attri-
butes’’ (e.g., type of reward, value of incentive), and
‘‘levels’’ of these attributes (e.g., cash, shopping
voucher; higher, lower values). Participants are
then asked which of a small number of intervention
‘‘scenarios,’’ combining different levels of each attri-
bute, they prefer. This allows relative preferences
for attribute levels to be determined when compar-
ing preferences for particular attribute levels to a
reference level. DCEs are well established in health
economics16–18 and increasingly used in public
health.19–21 We followed best practice recommenda-
tions for conducting a DCE,22,23 collecting data from
UK adults in an online survey. Ethical approval for
all aspects of this study was granted from Newcastle
University Ethics Committee (Reference 00748).
Identification of Attributes and Levels
We used a systematic review,6 qualitative inter-
views,14 and discussions with a project advisory
group of parents and guardians of preschool chil-
dren to identify attributes, and levels, of preschool
vaccination programs that are likely to influence
acceptability of vaccinations (see Table 1). We spe-
cifically included aspects of a parental financial
incentive program in this. In all cases, all attributes
and all levels chosen were realistic and plausible in
policy terms.22,23
The first attribute included was ‘‘type of parental
reward.’’ The most common types of financial
incentive offered for healthy behaviors in research
settings are cash rewards and shopping voucher
rewards.24 Shopping vouchers help allay common
concerns that recipients will use incentives for
‘‘unhealthy’’ behaviors, such as purchasing cigar-
ettes.7 In addition to cash and shopping voucher
reward levels, we also included a no reward level
for this attribute. Total value of parental financial
rewards were based on values used in previous
research,6 scaled across five levels from £0 to £280
(e0 to e370; US$0 to $400). A third attribute
included ‘‘which parents would receive a reward.’’
This included targeted rewards (given to parents
considered unlikely to have their child immunized)
and universal rewards (given to all parents). This is
based on previous research where incentives have
only been offered to those parents whose children
are not up-to-date with their vaccinations.25
Qualitative interviews identified that parents felt
that it could be helpful for a wider range of profes-
sionals to provide preschool vaccinations in a wider
range of settings to that currently available. Based
on these interviews and feedback from the parental
advisory group, the attribute ‘‘type of healthcare
professional administering vaccinations and loca-
tion of appointments’’ had six levels (Table 1).
Our parental advisory group specifically identi-
fied that current information on the risks and bene-
fits of preschool vaccinations was not optimal. Two
attributes related to this were included: ‘‘how infor-
mation about vaccinations is provided prior to the
appointment,’’ which focused on mode of informa-
tion delivery (written, electronic, or multimedia);
and ‘‘how information on the risk of your child get-
ting diseases is provided prior to the appointment,’’
which focused on whether information was in the
form of number, or charts and pictures.
Parents provided substantial feedback on the lim-
ited availability and long waiting times for vaccina-
tion appointments. Two attributes on these issues
were included ‘‘availability of appointments’’ and
‘‘waiting time at each appointment.’’
Experimental Design
The combinations of attributes and levels
described in Table 1 would generate 14,580 unique
scenarios (6 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 5 3 3 3 3); far too
many to be considered by any one individual.
Instead, a D-efficient design was generated using
Ngene design software (v 1.1.1).26 This resulted in
72 experimental scenarios (‘‘choice sets’’) being
required to estimate both main effects for each attri-
bute and key interactions between attributes.
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However, 72 choice sets is still too many to be
considered by any one individual. Thus, the 72
choice sets were randomly divided into four blocks
of 18 choice sets each, with participants randomly
assigned to one of these four blocks.
Each choice set of experimental scenarios was
combined with a third option of ‘‘neither’’ (do not
like either option—I would not have my child vac-
cinated). This opt-out option reflects policy in the
United Kingdom where vaccinations are not manda-
tory. In all choice sets it was stated that the number
of appointments required to complete the full vacci-
nation program was eight. This is the minimum
required to complete the current recommended pro-
gram in England. An example choice set is provided
in Figure 1.
Choice sets were embedded in a wider question-
naire. This collected information on basic sociode-
mographics (in order to characterize the sample).
Pretesting and Data Collection
Pretesting was undertaken with five parents or
guardians of preschool children (one male and four
females) using a paper version of the questionnaire
and a ‘‘think-aloud’’ approach.27 This explored
respondents’ understanding of the wording of ques-
tionnaire survey items, and the DCE choice task
resulting in some changes to wording and layout.
Recruitment and data collection was undertaken
by a market research company (ResearchNow.com)
who adhered to the highest standards of market
Table 1 Attributes and Levels Included in the Discrete Choice Experiment
Attribute Levels
Type of parental reward No reward
Cash reward for ‘‘complete’’ vaccinations
Shopping voucher as a reward for ‘‘complete’’ vaccinations
Parental reward value (received when the
full schedule of vaccinations is
completed)
£0
£70
£140
£210
£280
Which parents would receive a reward Targeted reward (given to parents considered unlikely to have their
child immunized)
Universal reward (given to all parents)
Current practice—no reward
Type of health care professional
administering vaccinations and location
of appointments
Practice nurse at local GP surgery
Community nurse at local clinic or children’s center
Health visitor in the community at local clinic or children’s center
Health visitor at neonatal visits at home
Community nurse in vaccination bus stationed at schools
Pharmacist who has received specific training on vaccination at local
pharmacy
How information about vaccinations
(benefits and risks) is provided prior to
the appointment
Written (post) plus verbal information at time of appointment
Electronic (email) plus verbal information at time of appointment
Electronic (multimedia film clips, words, and pictures via the Internet)
plus verbal information at time of appointment
How information about the risks and
benefits of vaccinations is provided prior
to the appointment
Provided in the form of numbers
Provided in the form of charts or pictures
Provided in the form of numbers and charts or pictures
Availability of appointments During working hours (9 AM to 5 PM)
During working hours (9 AM to 5 PM) + out of hours (evenings
[weekdays] and Saturday [9 AM to 5 PM])
Waiting time at each appointment Up to 30 minutes
Up to 60 minutes
Up to 120 minutes
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Characteristic Scenario A Scenario B 
Type of healthcare professional 
administering vaccinations and location  
Practice nurse at a local GP 
surgery 
Community nurse at local clinic 
or children’s centre 
The way you receive information about 
vaccinations prior to the appointment, plus 
verbal information at time of appointment 
provided in written form sent 
by post 
provided in electronic form in 
an email 
How information about the risks and 
benefits of vaccinations is provided prior to 
the appointment. 
provided in the form of 
numbers 
provided in the form of charts 
or pictures 
Availability of appointments working hours (9am to 5pm) working hours (9am to 5pm) + 
out of hours weekday evenings 
and Saturday 9am-5pm 
Type of parental reward for completing the 
full schedule of vaccinations 
cash reward Parents do not receive any 
reward 
Reward value payable to parents received 
when the full schedule of vaccinations is 
completed 
£70 No reward 
Which parents would receive a reward Only those considered 
unlikely to have their child 
immunised 
Current practice - no reward 
Waiting time at each appointment or 
scheduled appointment time 
up to 30 minutes up to 60 minutes 
Number of appointments to complete the full vaccination programme is 8. 
Which scenario do you prefer?  
? Scenario A 
? Scenario B 
? Neither (do not like either option – I would not have my child immunised)  
Figure 1 Example choice set
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research ethics.28 Main data collection took place
via an online survey. An internal pilot analysis of
the first 77 responses identified that the majority of
respondents (82%) stated that they fully understood
the DCE. Data collection proceeded and these 77
respondents were included in the final sample.
Participants and Sample Size
Parents or guardians who were 18 years or older,
had one or more children aged less than 5 years old,
who were currently residing in England, and who
were members of ResearchNow’s online panel were
eligible to participate in the study.
Using ‘‘by invitation’’ methods individuals with
known characteristics were directly targeted by
ResearchNow to stratify participants into one of two
subsamples in terms of their likelihood of not hav-
ing their children fully vaccinated. Respondents
who additionally met one of the following five
evidence-based criteria were used to stratify partici-
pants into a subgroup group of parents/guardians
who were at high risk of not fully vaccinating
their children5,29–32: live in one of the 20% most
deprived areas of England (identified by Index of
Multiple Deprivation 2010 score of lower super out-
put area of residence, calculated from postcode of
residence); have a preschool child with a physical
or mental disability; are a single parent or guard-
ian; are aged less than 20 years; and are the parent/
guardian of more than three children (of any age).
Participants that did not meet any of these five cri-
teria were stratified into a subsample of parents/
guardians who were ‘‘not at high risk’’ of fully vac-
cinating their children. ResearchNow were tasked
with recruiting 250 participants within each
subsample.
All participants were provided with written
information on the study before taking part and
indicated their consent to take part before data col-
lection took place. As per ResearchNow’s normal
procedures, participants received small (£2; ~$US3/
e2.5) shopping voucher as incentives to take part.
Optimal sample size requirements for DCEs
depend on knowledge of the true choice probabil-
ities, which are not known prior to undertaking the
research.33 For this reason, DCE sample size esti-
mates are generally based on previous research,
rules-of-thumb, and budget constraints. Given the
number of attributes included in the DCE, it was
estimated that a minimum sample size of 400 (i.e.,
200 high risk [50 per block], plus 200 not at high
risk [50 per block]) would provide sufficient statisti-
cal power.
Statistical Analyses
Data were analyzed for all respondents and sepa-
rately for two groups based on whether or not parti-
cipants met any of the criteria for being ‘‘at high
risk’’ of not fully vaccinating their children. Mixed
logit models were used to establish whether the
eight attributes presented in the choice scenarios
were statistically significant predictors of partici-
pants’ preferences in either group. In all models,
intercepts (alternative specific constants) and the
‘‘waiting time at each appointment’’ attribute were
assumed to be random and normally distributed
(mean and standard deviations reported); all other
parameters in the model remained fixed (mean esti-
mates reported only). Effects coding was used for all
attributes with the exception of ‘‘waiting time at
each appointment’’ and ‘‘parental reward value,’’
which were assumed to be linear. The level ‘‘no
reward’’ in the attribute ‘‘type of reward’’ was
omitted in these analyses due to multicollinearity
and only additionally included in the choice sets
descriptions for plausibility.
Trade-offs between attributes were considered as
marginal rates of substitution (MRS) between all sta-
tistically significant attributes in the mixed logit
models and the continuous variables, value of
reward and waiting time. Hence, marginal willing-
ness to accept (WTA) values were calculated in the
form of a minimum monetary value that would be
required as ‘‘compensation’’ for any change in the
level of an attribute associated with losses in utility.
Similarly, marginal willingness to wait (WTW) val-
ues indicate the maximum time respondents would
be willing to sacrifice for any change in the level of
an attribute with increases in utility. Comparing
MRS values allows the relative strength of prefer-
ences for each attribute to be compared. For attri-
bute levels with negative preferences, that is,
where disutility is experienced when moving from
the reference level to a different attribute level,
positive WTA and negative WTW values indicate
the minimum level of compensation (monetary or
in terms of reduced waiting time) participants
would be willing to accept to make up for the
absence of the preferred reference level. For attri-
bute levels with positive preferences, that is,
where moving from the reference level to a differ-
ent attribute level is associated with a utility gain,
FLYNN AND OTHERS
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positive WTW values indicate the maximum sacri-
fice in terms of increased waiting time respondents
would be willing to make for a level preferred to
the reference level. Negative WTA estimates are
included for completeness, but do not have any
immediate policy implications.
RESULTS
Complete data were collected from 521
participants—259 in the ‘‘at high risk’’ group and
262 in the not ‘‘at high risk group.’’ Characteristics
of participants are described in Table 2. As would
be expected from the criteria used to define ‘‘at high
risk’’ participants, participants in this group were
more likely to be single or separated/divorced/
widowed, more likely to live in households with
the lowest income ,and less likely to live in house-
holds with the highest income, less likely to have
obtained a degree, less likely to be employed and
more likely to be unemployed, more likely to have a
child with a disability, and had more children over-
all than participants not in the ‘‘at high risk’’ group.
Table 3 shows the results of the mixed logit mod-
els. Here, positive coefficients represent a positive
preference (utility) associated with a particular level
of an attribute compared to the reference level,
whereas negative coefficients represent a negative
preference (disutility). Statistically significant dif-
ferences are marked, and WTA values for these cal-
culated. Scenarios A and B were the most fre-
quently chosen options, making up for 48% and
47%, respectively, of responses. The opt-out option
was chosen for 5% of choices. Out of the 38 respon-
dents who chose the opt-out option, the majority
(n = 25) did so constantly across all choices pre-
sented to them.
Participants who were ‘‘at high risk’’ of incom-
pletely vaccinating their children had a significant
preference for cash rewards compared to no rewards
(WTA 2£245). However, there was no difference in
preference for voucher compared to no rewards in
these participants. There was no difference in pre-
ference across any of the levels of ‘‘type of reward’’
in participants who were not ‘‘at high risk’’ of
incomplete vaccination. Only participants who
were not ‘‘at high risk’’ had a preference for higher
value rewards. Both subgroups expressed a signifi-
cant negative preference for targeted rewards that
was substantially stronger in those ‘‘at high risk’’
(WTA = £462) compared to those ‘‘not at high risk’’
(WTA = £126).
There was statistically significant disutility asso-
ciated with vaccinations delivered by pharmacists,
compared to practice nurses, in both groups. This
was substantially stronger in the ‘‘at high risk’’
group than the ‘‘not at high risk’’ group (WTA =
£357 and £88, respectively). In the ‘‘not at high
risk’’ group there was also a significant negative pre-
ference for vaccinations delivered by community
nurses in buses located near schools (WTA = £104)
and significant positive preference for health visi-
tors providing vaccinations in the community
(WTA = 2£66).
There were no differences in preferences for how
information on the risks and benefits of vaccination
was received in either group. However, parents ‘‘at
high risk’’ of incompletely vaccinating their chil-
dren had a significant disutility associated with
information in the form of charts and pictures com-
pared to information provided as numbers along
(WTA = £186).
Parents ‘‘not at high risk’’ had a preference for
vaccination appointments being available out of
hours as well as during working hours (WTA =
2£23). This was not seen in those parents who were
‘‘at high risk.’’ Both groups preferred shorter waiting
times, although this preference was stronger in those
‘‘at high risk’’ compared to those ‘‘not at high risk’’
(WTA values for each additional minute waited after
30 minutes was £22 and £5, respectively).
DISCUSSION
Summary of Findings
This is the first DCE we are aware of that has
investigated parental preferences for changes that
could be made to preschool vaccination (children
up to age 5 years) services. It is also the first DCE
we are aware of to explore parental preferences for
financial incentives for preschool vaccinations.
There was no difference in preference for cash or
voucher incentives compared to no incentive in
those parents ‘‘not at high risk’’ of incomplete vacci-
nation. Parents who were ‘‘at high risk’’ expressed a
positive preference for cash, compared to no incen-
tive. Both groups preferred universally available
rewards, compared to those targeted at just some
groups. There were also significant preferences for
shorter waiting times. While parents ‘‘not at high
risk’’ preferred vaccinations delivered by a health
visitor, rather than practice nurse, at a GP surgery,
there was a significant disutility associated with
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vaccinations delivered in other locations and by
other professionals. Parents ‘‘at high risk’’ of incom-
plete vaccination preferred information on the risks
and benefits of vaccinations to be provided as num-
bers, and not as charts or pictures.
Interpretation of Findings
Little previous work has explored acceptability
of parental financial incentives for preschool vacci-
nations.6 We found no difference in preference for
cash and voucher incentives over no incentives in
parents ‘‘not at high risk’’ of incomplete vaccina-
tion, and a positive preference for cash incentives
over no incentives in those ‘‘at high risk.’’ This indi-
cates that the acceptability of health promoting
financial (cash or voucher) incentives in the context
of preschool vaccinations may differ as a function
of population characteristics.
Another DCE exploring preferences for financial
incentives for smoking cessation, physical activity,
and attendance of adults for vaccinations and
Table 2 Characteristics of the Sample
Variable Category
At High Risk of
Incomplete Vaccination
(n = 259)
Not at High Risk of
Incomplete Vaccination
(n = 262)
Mean (SD) n (%) Mean (SD) n (%)
Questionnaire version 1 64 (25%) 65 (25%)
2 65 (25%) 66 (25%)
3 65 (25%) 66 (25%)
4 65 (25%) 65 (25%)
Age 33.8 (6.9) 34.3 (5.1)
Female 204 (79%) 166 (63%)*
Relationship status Married/cohabitation/civil partner 137 (53%) 258 (99%)*
Single 92 (36%) 3 (1%)*
Separated/divorced/widowed 30 (12%) 1 (\1%)*
Annual household
income (pre-tax)
\£15,000 64 (25%) 19 (7%)*
£15,000 to\£26,000 60 (23%) 46 (18%)
£26,000 to\£35,000 40 (15%) 48 (18%)
£35,000 to\£50,000 51 (20%) 70 (27%)
£50,000 to\£70,000 23 (9%) 35 (13%)
£70,000 14 (5%) 35 (13%)*
Prefer not to say 7 (3%) 9 (3%)
Highest level of education GCSE/O-level/CSE/NVQ 72 (28%) 55 (21%)
A-level or equivalent 68 (26%) 60 (23%)
Degree/masters/PhD 106 (41%) 145 (55%)*
No formal qualifications 6 (2%) 1 (\1%)
Other 4 (2%) 1 (\1%)
Prefer not to say 3 (1%) 0 (0%)
Employment status Employed/maternity leave 179 (69%) 202 (77%)*
Unemployed 9 (4%) 2 (1%)*
Not in labor force 65 (25%) 52 (20%)
Other 5 (2%) 3 (1%)
Prefer not to say 1 (\1%) 3 (1%)
Ethnicity White 229 (88%) 219 (84%)
Asian 16 (6%) 27 (10%)
Black 5 (2%) 12 (5%)
Other 3 (1%) 2 (1%)
Prefer not to say 6 (2%) 2 (1%)
No children 2.5 (1.4) 1.5 (0.6)*
Have a child with a disability 20 (8%) 0 (0%)*
*Statistically significantly different from the ‘‘at high risk’’ subgroup, tested using t test (continuous variables) and chi-squared tests (frequencies);
P\ .05.
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screening also found that cash or shopping vou-
chers incentives were preferred as much or more
than no incentives.34 These findings (along with
those of the current DCE) are in contrast to qualita-
tive work and surveys, which tends to find that
incentives are generally not considered accepta-
ble.7–9,14
Differences in findings between previous qualita-
tive work and the present DCE may reflect differ-
ences in participants, or differences in the context
in which questions are asked. It is possible that
DCE participants feel less inhibited by the anonym-
ity of Internet data collection, while qualitative data
are more subject to social desirability bias. Alterna-
tively, participants in qualitative research often
spend at least an hour discussing topics and so may
arrive at more considered opinions than those tak-
ing part in DCEs. Further research is required to
understand why findings related to preferences for
financial incentives for healthy behaviors appear to
consistently differ when explored using DCE versus
qualitative methods.
The finding that targeted rewards were much less
acceptable than universal rewards reflects some,
but not all, previous findings. Some qualitative
work has found that financial incentives for other
health behaviors are more acceptable when targeted
at ‘‘vulnerable’’ groups such as those living in low-
income circumstances.7–9 However, other work
focused on preschool vaccinations reflects the cur-
rent preference for universal financial incentives.14
A similar preference for universal incentives was
found in a DCE on preferences for financial incen-
tives across a range of healthy behaviours.34
The positive preference for cash rewards by par-
ents in the ‘‘at high risk’’ group may be attributable
to their income status. Increasing value of a reward
was only associated with significant utility in those
‘‘not at high risk.’’ Thus, the offer of any reward
may be particularly salient for some (perhaps less
affluent), while others are more strongly influenced
by the value of the reward offered. While recipient
socioeconomic position has been postulated as a
determinant of effectiveness of health promoting
financial incentives, with those of lower socioeco-
nomic position being assumed to be more respon-
sive,8 little work has investigated this association.24
Our qualitative work suggested that more flexibil-
ity in where vaccinations are delivered was pre-
ferred.14 However, this was not reflected in our
DCE. The DCE findings may reflect perceptions con-
cerning which professionals have adequate training
and which locations are ‘‘safe’’ for vaccination
delivery—although it is surprising that these issues
were not also raised in qualitative interviews.
There is robust evidence that graphical displays
such as bar graphs and pictographs can effectively
support communication of balanced probabilistic
information to people irrespective of health literacy
level.35 However, parents ‘‘at high risk’’ expressed a
negative preference for this sort of information.
More research is needed to engage parents in an
iterative co-design process to develop optimally
acceptable and usable information that conveys
robust and balanced data on the benefits and risks
of vaccinations.
Implications of Findings for Policy, Practice,
and Research
Our findings indicate that parental financial
incentives for preschool vaccinations would be no
less acceptable to parents than the current practice
of not offering such incentives. If evidence emerges
supporting the effectiveness of such schemes, then
parental acceptability is unlikely to be a substantial
barrier to implementation. However, any incentives
would have to be offered universally to maximize
acceptability. Similar work in relevant professionals
and the wider public is required to establish how
acceptable they consider such incentives—as this
may also influence how easy it is to implement.
Parents, understandably, prefer shorter waiting
times for vaccination appointments. Avoiding block
bookings—where many people are given the same
appointment time and then seen on a first come, first
serve basis—is likely to help in this regard. Offering
out-of-hours appointments was only preferred by
parents who were ‘‘not at high risk’’ of incomplete
vaccination, indicating that this may not have a sub-
stantial impact on vaccination uptake. Providing
more flexible vaccination delivery—by a range of
providers in different locations—met with mixed
reactions, and furthermore, careful consideration is
required before any substantial changes are made in
this regard. More work is required to develop effec-
tive (in terms of communication) and accessible
information of the risks and benefits of preschool
vaccinations.
Strengths and Limitations of Methods
The strength of the DCE approach is that it allows
relative preferences for multiple factors that may
influence decision making to be explored.
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Moreover, we incorporated WTA terms into the
analyses to facilitate the interpretation of results.
We followed best practice recommendations for
conducting and designing a DCE, with combina-
tions of attributes and levels presented in scenarios
that were designed to minimize potential for bias.
In order to increase the validity of our findings and
reduce bias from respondents’ use of shortcuts,
heuristics, or random choice, we 1) ensured scenar-
ios were realistic and plausible in policy terms; 2)
utilized best practice methods to minimize the
number of scenarios presented to participants; and
3) tested the designed scenarios using a think-aloud
protocol during the pretesting stages.
We were also able to compare results from two
contrasting groups of parents and guardians—those
‘‘at high risk’’ and those ‘‘not at high risk’’ of incom-
pletely vaccinating their children. In some cases
preferences between the two groups were different.
This indicates that the two groups cannot necessa-
rily be combined and provides some indication of
what changes to services might be particularly help-
ful in increasing uptake among those currently ‘‘at
high risk’’ of not vaccinating. These nuances and
differences would not have been captured in a more
population representative sample. Throughout, we
were careful to follow best practice guidance for the
conduct of DCEs,22,23 and to ensure that the attri-
butes and levels used were both evidence-based
and plausible in policy terms.
Given the lack of empirical evidence, we did
not explore differences in preferences as a function
of how many criteria for being at high risk of not
fully vaccinating their children parents/guardians
achieved. However, we acknowledge this may have
yielded a differential pattern of results and should
be explored in future work in this area.
The sample was effectively a convenience sam-
ple, meaning it may not be representative. Further-
more, by using the recruitment method we did, it is
not possible to determine response rates to the sur-
vey. Previous DCE research suggest that alternative
methods of recruitment and data collection, such as
random postal or telephone surveys associated with
time and budget constraints, achieve very low
response rates, which also threatens representative-
ness.36 By using an opt-in panel it is possible that
our results were skewed by ‘‘professional respon-
ders,’’ who could be assumed to be more likely to
use shortcuts, heuristics, or random choice when
completing questionnaires, which may reduce the
quality of responses. However, recent findings
indicate such responders are unlikely to represent a
significant threat to validity of findings.37
We combined health care professional delivering
immunizations and the place of delivery of immuni-
zations into one attribute. Although these may be
seen as separate constructs, they are inextricably
linked and this was noted by our parental advisory
group. Separating them out would have imposed a
prohibitive number of design constraints, which
would have had negative implications for the model
parameters and conclusions that could be drawn
from the results.
CONCLUSIONS
We identified that universal ‘‘high value’’
rewards, in the form of cash payments for parents/
guardians, are likely to be acceptable within popu-
lations at high risk of incomplete vaccination with-
out any negative impact on current high uptake
rates of parents/guardians who are not at high risk
of incomplete vaccination. The cost of incentives
could be offset by offering additional flexibility in
terms of alternative community settings for vaccina-
tions and out of hours appointments. Further work
is required to develop methods of communicating
risks and benefits of vaccinations that are both opti-
mally effective and accessible to parents/guardians.
Mandatory schemes may be more acceptable alter-
natives to incentives, and further research should
investigate parental preferences for organization of
such schemes.
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